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In the SupreiDe Court 
of the State of Utah 
NATIONAL FINANCE COMPANY 
OF PROVO, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
DALLAS E. DALEY and 
FLORA DALEY, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
Intermediate Appeal from the Order of the 
2nd Judicial Court for Weber County 
Hon. Parley E. N orseth, Judge 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This is an action brought by the plaintiff-respondent 
upon a judgement made and entered by the Ogden City 
Court, the defendants-appellants having been adjudicated 
bankrupts and discharged in bankruptcy after the entry 
of the Judgment and prior to the filing of the suit 
upon such judgment, the plaintiff-respondent replying 
that such judgment is excepted from discharge in 
bankruptcy as a result of the false representations of 
the defendants in incurring the debt which was merged 
into the judgment. 
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DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Defendants-appellants moved the lower court for 
a judgment upon the pleadings. The District Court 
denied such motion and defendants have brought this 
intermediate appeal. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendants-appellants seek a reversal, as a matter 
of law, of the order of the District Court denying their 
motion for judgment on the pleadings. Plaintiff-appellant 
seeks to have such order affirmed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This matter comes before the above entitled Court 
upon an intermediate appeal from an Order of the 
District Court of Weber County, State of Utah, denying 
defendants Motion for Judgment upon the pleadings. 
There has been no evidence taken in the case, and 
the appeal is based entirely upon the record and 
pleadings filed in the District Court. 
On the 29th day of May, 1958, the defendants made, 
executed and delivered to the plaintiff their written 
promissory note in the principal sum of $577.69, when 
such note was not paid, the plaintiff brought an action 
in the City Court of Ogden City, Weber County, State 
of Utah, against the defendants which suit was bas~d 
upon the promissory note. Thereafter, on the 7th day 
of January, the said Ogden City Court entered a Default 
Judgment against each of the defendants for the sum of 
$668.12, such amount being the amount of the note plus 
the accrued interest thereon to the date of the Judgment 
and Court costs. 
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On or about the 17th day of February, 1961, the 
plaintiff filed this action in the District Court of Weber 
County, State of Utah, alleging in, its Complaint that 
the plaintiff had on the 7th day of January, 1959, in 
an action filed in the City Court of Ogden. City, Weber 
County, State of Utah, entitled National Finance of 
Provo, plaintiff -vs- Dallas E. Daley and Flora Daley, 
defendants, Civil No. 29232, a Judgment was duly made 
and entered by the City Court in favor of the plaintiff 
and against the defendants therein for the sum of 
$668.12 together with interest thereon at the rate of 
eight (8%) per annum from the date thereof and that 
such Judgment remains wholly unpaid and unsatisfied. 
The plaintiff by its Complaint in the District Court 
action sought a new judgment for the sum of $668.12, 
interest and Court costs. 
To such complaint, the defendants filed their 
answer alleging that on the 23rd day of May, 1959, the 
defendants, and each of them, filed their petition in 
the United States Court for the District of Utah and 
were duly adjudicated bankrupts; that the plaintiff's 
claim was scheduled therein and that the defendants were 
discharged as bankrupts in accordance with the acts 
of Congress relating to bankruptcy. 
Defendants by their answer are claiming that the 
claim upon which plaintiff's complaint was based has 
been discharged in bankruptcy and that such bankruptcy 
is a bar to the prosecution of the above entitled action. 
At the time of the pre-trial of the above entitled 
action, the Court authorized plaintiff to file its Reply 
and plaintiff did file its Reply in this action alleging 
in part as follows: 
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"Plaintiff alleges and states that if the defendants 
or either of them secured an order of discharge 
in bankruptcy or have been adjudicated bankrupts, 
that such discharge or such adjudication in bank-
ruptcy does not and will not operate to discharge 
or release the obligation sued upon herein, for 
the reason that such obligation constitutes a 
liability for obtaining money or property by 
false pretenses or false representations within 
the meaning of Section 17 a ( 2) of the Bankruptcy 
Act, in that the defendants on or about the 29th 
day of May, 1958, obtained a loan of money 
from the plaintiff in the sum of $577.69, with 
interest upon $300.00 thereof at the rate of 3% 
per month and upon $277.69 thereof at the rate of 
1% per month from the date of such loan, and 
defendants delivered to plaintiff their promissory 
note as evidence thereof, which loan was secured 
through the making and publishing of a materially 
false statement of defendant's indebtedness upon 
which the plaintiff relied in making said loan 
to the defendants ; that in said statement, 
defendants misrepresented the amount of their 
indebtedness to other creditors and failed to 
disclose, but rather concealed, obligations owing 
to various other creditors in an amount in excess 
of the sum of $2,066.00 over and above the amount 
of the indebtedness disclosed by such statement; 
that the misrepresentations of the defendants 
were material and were relied upon by the 
plaintiff to its damage and prejudice. 
"That the plaintiff, on or about the 5th day of 
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December, 1958 brought suit against the defend-
dants upon the aforesaid loan from plaintiff to 
defendants in an action filed in the City Court of 
Ogden City, Weber County, State of Utah, 
entitled National Finance Company of Provo, 
plaintiff, -vs- Dallas E. Daley and Flora Daley, 
defendants, Civil No. 20232, and did, upon the 
7th day of January, 1959, in said action obtain a 
judgment in said Court in favor of this plaintiff 
and against the defendants herein for the sum of 
$668.12, with interest at the rate of 8% per annum 
from the 7th day of January, 1959, which judg-
ment is the judgment now sued upon in this 
action." 
For the purpose of this appeal, the plaintiff admits 
that the defendants were adjudicated bankrupts sub-
sequent to the entry of the judgment in the action 
brought by the plaintiff against the defendants in the 
City Court of Ogden City, Weber County, State of Utah, 
and that the claim of the plaintiff, merged into such 
Judgment, was duly scheduled in such bankruptcy 
proceedings and that the defendants and each of them 
were subsequently discharged in bankruptcy. Plaintiff 
also admits that the suit brought in the City Court of 
Ogden City was brought upon the note and that in the 
City Court action there were no allegations in the 
pleadings that the loan evidenced by such note was 
obtained through false pretenses or false representations 
or fraud. 
The issue presented upon this appeal is whether or 
not the District Court may now look beyond the record 
and examine the facts relating to the manner in which 
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the original obligation was incurred to determine 
whether or not the adjudicated indebtness is one excepted 
from the discharge in bankruptcy. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
DEBTS INCURRED BY FALSE REPRESENTA-
TIONS ARE NOT DISCHARGED IN BANKRUPTCY. 
Liabilities for obtaining money or property by 
false pretenses or false representations are declared 
among the debts not affected by a discharge of bank-
ruptcy. Section 17a (2) of the Bankruptcy Act (11 U.S. 
C.A. 35) provides as follows : 
"Debts not affected by a discharge." 
"A discharge in bankruptcy shall release a bank-
rupt from all his provable debts, whether in full 
or in part, except such as ... (2) are liabilities 
for obtaining money or property by false pre-
tenses or false representations . . . " (emphasis 
supplied) 
As the United States Supreme Court said in Pepper 
vs. Litton, 308 U. S. 295, 84 Lawyers Addition 28, public 
policy demands that the "act should be liberally con-
strued so as to prevent the discharge in bankruptcy of a 
liability which would not exist but for the fraudulent 
conduct of the bankrupt." 
A false financial statement given to obtain a loan 
of money or to obtain property under an installment 
sales contract will present the basis for a determination 
that the obligation arising thereby is not dischargeable 
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within the meaning of Section 17a (2) of the Act. While 
there would seem to be no hard and fast rule as to what 
constitutes a false representation in a financial state-
ment, the omission, concealment, or understatement ·of 
liabilities, when material, is considered to be sufficient. 
The instances in which state courts have held that 
an understatement of liabilities in a financial statement 
constituted "false representations" are innumerable. 
Typical are Railroad Employee's Person Loan Co. vs. 
Dillon ( 1939) 123 N .J .L. 31, 7 A. (2nd) 855 ; Watts et.al. 
vs. Ward (Mass. App. Div. N. District.) 29 B.T.L. 179; 
Workingmen's Loan Association vs. Leslie Magoon, Mass. 
App. Div. Boston Muni Ct. Dist. No. 157683; Personal 
Finance Co. of Waterbury vs. Robinson, (1941) Supreme 
Ct. Trial and Special Term, Madison County 27 N.Y.S. 
(2d) 6; Personal Finance Co. of New York vs. Ralph L. 
Vosburg, (S. Ct. N.Y. St. Lawrence, Jan. 13, 1942); 
Chester-Neal Co. vs. Generazzo, (1942) 20 N.J. Mise. 
296, 26 A (2nd) 867; also profitable to examine are other 
factual situations held to be within Sec. 17a (2). To be 
noted in this connection are Symmes vs. Rollins, ( 1928) 
39 Ga. App. 546, 176 S.E. 516; Gregory vs. Williams, 
(1920) 106 Kan. 819, 189 P. 932; Mathewson vs. Naylor, 
(1937) 18 Cal. App. (2d) 741, 64 P. (2d) 979; Grespi & 
Co. vs. Griffen, (1933) 132 Cal. App. 526, 23 P. (2d) 47; 
Donahue vs. Conley, ( 1927) 85 Cal. App. 15, 258 P. 985; 
Guernsey-Newton Co. vs. Napier, (1929) 151 Wash. 318, 
275 P. 724. 
POINT II 
EVIDENCE OF FRAUD IS NOT A DEPARTURE 
FROM A SUIT BASED UPON A JUDGMENT 
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It is proper in avoidance of the defense of a dis-
charge in bankruptcy to show such matters as will put 
the case without the operation of the discharge of 
bankruptcy. To illustrate, the false representations made 
by way of a financial statement or declaration of 
indebtedness are asserted, not to change the cause of 
action from contract to fraud, but to prevent its being 
barred by the bankrupt in bankruptcy. When the 
affirmative defense of discharge in bankruptcy is 
asserted, the plaintiff has opportunity to meet that 
defense and to show that it does not constitute a bar to 
the action. The plaintiff is not attempting to state a 
different cause of action. This was emphasized by the 
Supreme Court of Kansas in the case of Gregory vs. 
Williams, 106 Kan. 819, 198, P. 932, 933: 
" ... The fraud was set up in the reply, not as a 
cause of action against the defendant, but to 
avoid the defense that had been pleaded ... The 
action continued as an action on the promissory 
note. The reply did not constitute a departure from 
the cause of action alleged in the bill of partic-
ulars ... " 
To demonstrate further, this theory of approach 
was favorably recognized in Kiser vs. Gerald, (1920} 17 
Ala. App. 648, 88 So. 49, 50. There the plaintiff instituted 
action both on common counts for goods sold, and on 
promissory notes. The answer asserted a discharge in 
bankruptcy. In reply, the plaintiff set up the false 
financial statement of the defendant, which was demurr-
ed on the ground that it constituted a departure by 
setting up a new cause of action in fraud and deceit. 
The demurrer was sustained by the lower court and the 
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plaintiff appealed. The appellant court, in reversing 
the trial court, said: 
"When the bankrupt's discharge is pleaded to an 
action on snch a debt, it is good replication that 
the debt was created by fraud, etc., and the court 
in which the action is brought has jurisdiction 
to try the issue. Broadnax vs. Bradford, 50 Ala. 
270; Blackman vs. McAdams, 131 Mo. App. 408, 
111 S. W. 599 Jacobson vs. Horne 52 Miss. 186; 
Argall vs. Jacobs, 87 N.Y. 110, 41 Am. Rep. 357. 
There are many authorities cited in the forego-
ing adjudicated cases to the same effect. The case 
of Strauch vs. Flynn, 108 Minn. 313, 1 22N.W. 
320, cited in appellee's brief, while sustaining 
appellee's contention, is opposed to the great 
weight of authority as well as to good reason. 
The replication does not set up a new cause of 
action declared on, but simply alleges facts 
exempting the plaintiff's claim from the operation 
of the Bankruptcy Act. The court erred in its 
ruling on the demurrer, and its judgment is 
reversed . . . " 
Some courts have held that a reply or replication is 
not necessary on the theory that the plaintiff is presumed 
to deny affirmative allegations and statements in the 
defendant's answer. It was so held in the case of Delatour 
vs. Lala, (1929) 12 La. App. 314, 125 So. 138, the third 
syllabus of which case reads: 
"Where defendant, in action on open account, 
alleged relief from plaintiff's claim by discharge 
in bankruptcy, plaintiff held entitled to show 
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without further pleading that his debt was 
excepted from discharge under Bankruptcy Act. 
Sec. 17 (11 U.S.C.A. Sec. 35) because it was a 
liability incurred by false pretenses and false 
representations, since plaintiff is presumed to 
deny affirmative allegations of defendant's 
answer and, then when special defense is made, 
there is no necessity resting upon plaintiff to 
expressly challenge facts on which it is based." 
See also Rules 7(a) and 8(d), Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure hereinafter set out. 
In this connection, see also Young vs. Grau, (1884) 
14 R.I. 340, 342, involving an action in debt on a New 
York Judgment where the Supreme Court of Rhode 
Island took occasion to comment. 
"A debt created by fraud is not void but voidable 
only and therefore a creditor may assert both the 
debt and the fraud at the same time, so long as he 
asserts the fraud to avoid not the debt but the 
discharge. The bankrupt act recognizes this when 
it allows the creditor to prove the debt for a 
dividend, and nevertheless, relieves it from the 
discharge, for the debt is provable as a debt, not 
as a tort." 
Particularly satisfying is the case of Stewart vs. 
Emerson (1872) 52 N.H. 301, 310, 311, where an action 
was brought in assumpsit for the price of goods sold. 
The defendant pleaded a discharge in bankruptcy to 
which the plaintiff asserted the fraud of the defendant. 
The court said: 
"The plaintiff declares upon a promise of the 
10 
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defendant to pay for goods sold, and, if he 
maintains his action, he maintains it upon the 
contract of sale affirmed by him. When a party 
has an election between two inconsistent rights 
or remedies - - for instance, when he can rely 
upon a contract or renounce the contract and rely 
upon fraud-- and has knowledge of all the facts 
material to be known in making a choice, his 
selection of one may be a renunciation of another. 
Butler vs. Hildreth1 5 Met. 49. But the plaintiff 
in this case avers the fraud of the defendant, not 
as the plaintiff's cause of action but as a refuta-
tion of the defendants alleged defense of dis-
charge. The plaintiff claims to recover damages, 
not for the defendant's fraud, but for the breach 
of his promise to pay for the goods bought; and 
in the replication he alleges the fraud not as the 
ground on which his action rests, but to show that 
there is no ground on which the defendant's 
discharge can be applied to this debt. He asserts, 
not that the sale was void for fraud, but that, by 
reason of fraud, the debt was not discharged 
under the bankrupt act. He asserts the fraud, 
not for the purpose of rescinding the contract, 
but to show that the defendant has not been 
relieved from his obligation to perform his part 
of the contract." (emphasis supplied) 
POINT III 
THE PLAINTIFF, IN AN ACTION UPON A 
JUDGMENT OR NOTE, IS NOT REQUIRED IN HIS 
COMPLAINT TO ALLEGE FRAUD OR MISREPRE-
SENTATION OF THE DEBTOR TO EXCEPT THE 
11 
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DEBT SUED UPON FROM THE BAR OF THE 
DEBTOR'S DISCHARGE IN BANKRUPTCY AND 
MAY SHOW FRAUD OR MISREPRESENTATION 
BY WAY OF REBUTTAL. 
In pleading under the contract theory, an action is 
brought as in an ordinary case of suit in contract or 
assumpsit. In the particular case before the Court, the 
suit has been brought upon the Judgment of the plaintiff 
against the defendants. When the defendants assert 
bankruptcy as a defense, the plaintiff, in rebuttal to the 
defense of bankruptcy, may show that the obligation is 
not dischargeable in bankruptcy under Section 17 of 
the Bankruptcy Act, for the reason that the debt was 
incurred by false pretenses of false representations with-
in the meaning of that section. In other words, it is 
proper in avoidance of the defense of a discharge in 
bankruptcy to show such matters as will put the case 
without the operation of the discharge such as false 
representations made by way of a materially false 
financial statement. Such evidence is offered not to 
change the cause of the action from contract to fraud 
but to show that the debt is not discharged in bankruptcy. 
That this is good pleading would appear obvious, 
for the defense of bankrupty is one which must be 
pleaded (Rule 8(c) U.R.C.P.) and which until asserted 
is not in issue. When asserted the plaintiff has oppor-
tunity to meet that defense and to show that it does not 
constitute a bar to the action. Symmes vs. Rollins, (Ga.) 
146 S.E. 42, Collier on Bankruptcy, 13th Ed., page 616; 
Zimmern vs. Blount, 238 Fed. 7 40; Fidelity & Casualty 
Co. of New York vs. Golombosky, (Conn.) 50 A. 2d 817. 
12 
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It should be kept in mind that, as hereinbefore dis-
cussed, the plaintiff in so doing is not attempting to 
state a different cause of action. 
Rule 7 (a) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, relating 
to pleadings allowed, provides as follows : 
"Pleadings. There shall be a complaint and an 
answer; and there shall be a reply to a counter-
claim denominated as such; an answer to a cross-
claim, if the answer contains a cross-claim; a 
third party complaint, if leave is given under Rule 
14 to summon a person who was not an original 
party ; and there shall be a third party answer, 
if a third party complaint is served. No other 
pleading shall be allowed, except that the court 
may order a reply to an answer or a third party 
answer." (emphasis supplied} 
Thus, under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the 
plaintiff is not permitted to reply to the affirmative 
defense of discharge in bankruptcy. And such affirm-
ative defense is "deemed as denied or avoided." Rule 
8( d) U.R.C.P. 
A California court has adopted the same approach. 
An action was pleaded on the contract in Crespe & Co. 
vs. Griffen et al. (1933) 132 Cal. App. 562, 23 P. 2d 47, 
in case before the District Court of Appeals, 4th District 
of California; there was no allegation of fraud asserted. 
The defendant had been discharged in bankruptcy. An 
appeal was taken from a judgment in favor of the plain-
tiff, the defendant contending that the proof of mis-
representation and fraud was admitted in evidence when 
it had not been pleaded. The California court, in af-
13 
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firming the judgment in favor of the plaintiff, said: 
" .... In the instant case the original obligation 
is on a promissory note. Fraud was included and 
incidental to the creation of that obligation. That 
incident was properly urged without pleading to 
avoid the plea of discharge in bankruptcy. Sec-
tion 462 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides : 
'Every material allegation of the complaint, not 
controverted by the answer, must, for the pur-
poses of the action, be taken as true; the state-
ment of any new matter in the answer in avoid-
ance or constituting a defense or counter claim 
must, on the trial, be deemed controverted by the 
opposite party." 
A similar practice obtains in New York. In Frey 
vs. Torrey, (1902) 75 N.Y. Sup. 40, 43, aff'd 175 N.Y. 
501, it is thusly described: 
"Subdivision 4 of 549, Code Civ. Proc .... (now 
sec. 826 of C.P.A. Subdivision 10) classifies an 
action to recover a debt induced by fraud as an 
action on contract ... The claimant may sue on 
contract and if the discharge in bankruptcy be 
pleaded, he may, in rebuttal, show that the debt 
was created by fraud, not to change his cause 
of action from contract to fraud, but to prevent 
its being barred by this discharge in bank-
ruptcy ... " 
As distinguished therefrom, the action was in con-
tract in the case of Argall vs. Jacobs, et. al., (1881) 87 
N.Y. 110, 114, and there, the court said: 
" ... It was not needful that the plaintiff should 
14 
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allege fraud in his complaint. It was no part of 
his cause of action. It was needful only for him 
to prove it, not as a part of his cause of action, 
but as an answer to the affirmative defense set 
up. (Composition of creditors and discharge in 
bankruptcy subsequent to the date of the note) 
"In this cause the plaintiff could sue the de-
fendants directly for the fraud or for the purchase 
price of the goods; and in either case he would 
have been obliged to surrender the notes upon 
the trial; or he could use, as he did, suit upon 
the notes; and in either case proof of the fraud 
would be an answer to the bankruptcy dis-
charge ... " 
The decision in the Argall case was followed in the 
much more recent case of Personal Finance Company 
of Waterbury vs. Robinson, et al (1941) Supreme Court 
Trial and Special Term, Madison County, 27 N.Y.S. 2d 
6, 9. The status and development of the New York law 
is most capably analyzed and considered by Justice Deyo 
in this case. He declared : 
"The question was specifically passed upon in 
Argall vs. Jacobs 87 N.Y. 110, 41 Am. Rep. 357. 
There, as in the case at bar, an action was brought 
upon a promissory note and no fraud was al-
leged in the complaint. The answer, as here, 
set up as an affirmative defense, a discharge 
in bankruptcy. Upon the trial, the plaintiff 
was permitted to give evidence tending to show 
that his debt was 'created by the fraud of the 
bankrupt,' which was the wording of the statute 
at that time. The appellate court held this to 
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be proper and affirmed the judgment for the 
plaintiff, saying at page 113 of 87 N.W. 'But it 
is further contended on the part of the defen-
dants that the plaintiff cannot have the benefit 
of the limitation contained in the act of 1867, 
because he did not base his cause of action upon 
the alleged fraud, but upon the promissory notes, 
making no allusion to the fraud in his complaint. 
It is not provided that no cause of action for 
fraud shal be discharged, but that "no debt 
created by fraud" shall be discharged. These 
promissory notes were debts of the defendants, 
and the plaintiff was induced by the fraud of 
the defendants to sell goods to them and take 
their notes therefor, and hence these debts were 
created by their fraud within the meaning of the 
Bankruptcy Act. It was not needful that the 
plaintiff should allege the fraud in his complaint. 
It was no part of his cause of action. It was 
needful only to him to prove it, not as part of his 
cause of action, but as an answer to the affirma-
tive defenses set up. 
"A similar decision was reached in Frey vs. 
Torrey, 70 App. Div. 166, 75 N.Y.S. 40, affirmed 
175 N.Y. 501, 67 N.E. 1082, subsequently over-
ruled on other grounds in Tindle vs. Berkett, 183 
N.Y. 267, 76 N.E. 25, affirmed 205 U.S. 183, 27 
S Ct. 49·3 51 L. Ed. 762, on the authority of 
Crawford vs. Burke, 195 U.S. 176, 25 S. St. 9, 
49, L. Ed. 147. In this case, the Court said at 
page 171 of 70 App. Div., at page 43 of 75 N.Y.S.' 
'The claimant may sue on contract, and if the 
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discharge in bankruptcy be pleaded he may, in 
rebuttal, show that the debt was created by fraud, 
not to change his cause of action from contract 
to fraud, but to prevent its being barred by the 
discharge of bankruptcy. 
"Although the proof submitted by the defendant 
is not as full and complete as might be desired, 
it is sufficient to indicate that there is a genuine 
question of fact to be determined relative to the 
character of the claim asserted. That being the 
case, the matter cannot and should not be sum-
marily decided on this motion (Munoz & Co., vs. 
Savannah Sugar Refining Corp., 118 Misc. 24, 
193 N.Y.S. 422, regardless of defects and omis-
sions in the pleadings ( Erzinger vs. Lie berman, 
218 App. Div. 847, 219 N.Y.S. 28), for such de-
fects may conceivably be removed by amendment 
at the trial or sooner. Curry vs. Mackenzie, 239 
N.Y. 267, 146 N.E. 375." 
The recent Utah case of National Finance Company 
of Utah vs. Valdez, 11 Utah 2d 339, 359 P. 2d 9, is an 
action against a bankrupt upon a note and chattel mort-
gage which the bankrupt alleged represented a debt 
which had been discharged in bankruptcy, the Supreme 
Court of the State of Utah held that the loan evidenced 
by a promissory note had been obtained by fraud and 
was excepted from discharge in bankruptcy and that 
the plaintiff could maintain the action upon the note 
and was not confined to an action for fraud, the Utah 
Court stating as follows: 
"In considering the question before us, it must 
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be remembered that a discharge in bankruptcy 
is neither a payment nor the extinguishment of 
debts. It is simply a bar to their enforcement 
by legal proceedings. Thus, the note here sued 
upon was not extinguished by the bankruptcy, but 
is still in existence and its collection enforceable 
if excepted from a discharge under Section 17 
of the Bankruptcy Act. 
"We believe that a loan, evidenced by a promis-
sory note which is obtained by fraud is excepted 
from a discharge in bankruptcy. This being so, 
the plaintiff here could maintain its action on the 
note and was not confined to an action based 
upon fraud. In Section 17 it is not provided 
that a cause of action for fraud is not discharged, 
but that no debt created by fraud shall be dis-
charged. 
"The defendant's final contention is that the 
plaintiff, by electing to rely upon the contract, 
had waived the issue of fraud. This contention, 
for the reasons heretofore set forth, is without 
merit." 
POINT IV 
IN A SUIT UPON A JUDGEMENT, THE COURT 
MAY AND SHOULD RECEIVE EVIDENCE BEYOND 
THE RECORD AND EXAMINE THE FACTS AND 
CHARACTER OF THE ORIGINAL OBLIGATION 
TO DETERMINE WHETHER OR NOT THE JUDG-
MENT DEBT IS ONE EXCEPTED FROM THE 
DISCHARGE IN BANKRUPTCY. 
The introductory comment to the Annotation at 
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170 A.L.R. 368, cited by Appellant states as follows: 
''Frequently, a debt which was nondischargeable 
in its original fonn has been supplemented by 
a form of obligation, such as a note or a judgment, 
which is not in any of the classes of debts excepted 
frorn the operation of the discharge, and is, 
presumptively at least, dischargeable unless the 
court may go behind the note or the judgment 
and ascertain the character of the original 
obligation as one not dischareable. In such cases, 
the courts have pretty uniformly held that the 
transformation of the evidences of the original 
nondischargeable obligation does not render it 
dischargeable, as the court may look through 
the new form and discover that the indebtedness 
in its inception was of a character nondischarge-
able. (emphasis supplied) 
"Thus, it has been generally held that a claim 
which is not dischargeable under the provision of 
the bankruptcy Act is not rendered dischargeable 
by the recovery of a judgment thereon. In such 
case the judgment itself is not dischargeable. 
Parker vs. Whittier (1899) CCA 1st 91 F 511, 1 
Am. Bankr. 621 (writ of certorari denied in (1898) 
147 US 802, 32 L. Ed. 1187, 19 S. Ct. 887) ; 
Thompson vs. Judy (1909; CCA 6th) 169 F. 553, 
22 Am. Bankr. 154; Peters vs. United States 
(1910; CCA 4th) 177 F 885, 24 Am. Bankr. 206 
(writ of certiorari denied in (1909) 217 US 606, 
54 LEd 900, 30 S. Ct. 696). Whoerle vs. Ganclini 
(1910) 158 Cal. 107, 109 P. 888. Moody vs. 
niuscegee 1'Ifg. Co. (1910) 134 Ga 721, 68 SE 
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604, 20 Ann Cas. 301. Oberreich vs. Foster (1909 
148 Ill. A pp. 297 (affirmed in ( 1907) 230 ill. 525, 
82 NE 858; Halsy vs. Jordan (1910) 155 Ill. App. 
144. State ex rel. Wheatley vs. Beck (1911) 175 
Ind. 312, 93 NE 664. Wade vs. Clark (1879) 52 
Iowa 158, 2 NW 1039, 35 Am Rep 262. Brown vs. 
Hannagan (1911) 210 Mass. 246, 96 NE 714 27 
Am. Bankr. 294. Simpson vs. Simpson (1879) 80 
NC 332. Chambers vs. Kirk (1914) 41 Okla 696, 
139 P. 986, 32 Am. Bankr. 175. Young vs. Grau 
(1884) 14 RI 340." 
It was held in Gehlen vs. Patterson, (1928) 83 N.H. 
328, 141 A. 914, that the fact that an action has been 
instituted on a promissory note, rather than on the fraud 
which was practiced in obtaining the loan for which the 
note was given, and the fact that a judgment has been 
recovered in such action and an action has been insituted 
on the judgment, does not preclude the judgment creditor 
from showing that by reason of the fraud in the inception 
of the debt the judgment recovered was saved from the 
relief of the discharge in bankruptcy under statutory 
exception therefrom of certain classes of liabilities. The 
Court said: 
"Here the note was reduced to judgment before 
the bankruptcy and the action is on the judgment 
debt. But if the note was a liability for fraud in 
the sense that the loan for which it was given was 
obtained by fraud, no less is the judgment such 
a liability. The note became merged in the judg-
ment, but the fact that the loan it represented 
was thus obtained applies to the judgment debt 
as much as the note. That the plaintiff should 
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suffer by having reduced the note to judgment 
before the bankruptcy would be to impose a 
vicarious penalty which Congress is not to be 
assumed to have intended in the absence of 
language clearly showing such a purpose." 
It has been held that proof against the estate of the 
bankrupt of a claim reduced to judgment, although the 
judginent was obtained on a promissory note and not on 
the fraud which existed in the obtainment of the loan 
for which the note was given, does not preclude the 
judgment creditor from showing that the bankrupt was 
under liability to her for obtaining money from her by 
fraud. Gehlen vs. Patterson, (1928) 83 N.H. 328, 141 A 
914, 17 Am. Bankr. NS 131. 
The liability of an insurance agent for failure to 
return to the insurance Company premiums received by 
it on policies issued, and for cashing a check with the 
insurance company drawn on a bank in which he had no 
account, is excepted from the discharge in bankruptcy 
of such insurance agent by the provisions of Sec. 17 of 
the Bankruptcy Act (11 U.S.C.A. Sec. 35). 
In the case of Lyon vs. Lyon, 115 Utah 466, 206 P. 
2d 148 plaintiff brought suit against her former husband 
on a property settlement incorporated into a decree of 
divorce. Subsequent to the property settlement and the 
divorce, the defendant had taken Bankruptcy and 
scheduled the Judgment debt to the wife. The defendant 
contended that the obligation was discharged in Bank-
ruptcy, and that the plaintiff could not recover. The 
Trial Court had permitted evidence of conversations 
prior to the making of the property settlement to 
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determine the nature of the settlement and, on such 
evidence held that the obligation was not dischargeable 
as it was excepted from discharge by Section 17 of the 
Bankruptcy Act as a "debt . . . for alimony due or to 
become due, or for maintenance or support of wife or 
child." 
To the defendant's objection that the trial erred in 
permitting evidence outside the judgment record to be 
introduced and received in evidence to determine the 
nature of the obligation, the Utah Supreme Court held 
that Courts will look behind a judgment to ascertain 
whether the obligation which was merged in the judgment 
is dischargeable in bankruptcy, saying at page 472 of 
the Utah Reports: 
"It may be true, as contended by defendant, that 
as a general rule a trial court will not look behind 
a judgment or decree to determine the nature 
thereof, unless it is so ambiguous or uncertain 
that extrinsic evidence is necessary to explain it. 
However, plaintiff has cited to us a number of 
cases holding that courts will look behind a 
judgment to ascertain whether the obligation 
which was merged in the judgment was discharge-
able in bankruptcy ... (citing cases). The rule 
announced in the cases and texts above cited is 
reasonable and necessary to give full effect to 
the legislative intent. Otherwise} many obligations 
intended to be excepted from the discharge 
provisions of the Bankruptcy Act might never-
theless become discharged simply because they 
had been merged in judgments or into written 
contracts. The Court did not err in receiving 
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extrinsic evidence to show the true nature of the 
obligation of defendant to plaintiff." (emphasis 
supplied) 
The defendant-appellants in their Brief, having 
admitted that there is much authority to the effect that 
the Court may receive evidence extrinsic of the judgment 
record to detennine the true nature of the obligation and 
its dischargeability in bankruptcy, attempt to convince 
the court that the "weight of authority" and the "major-
ity" of the decisions are to the contrary. Plaintiff has not 
counted the decisions and doubts that defendants or the 
authors they cite have counted them. Suffice it to say, 
that the Utah Courts, and the better reasoned decisions 
all hold that the trial court may look outside the judgment 
record to determine the nature of the obligation merged 
into the judgment and whether or not it is excepted from 
discharge. 
Various other recent and well-considered cases, 
including a decision by the U.S. Court of Appeals (Cir. 
2) have held that where the record does not disclose the 
nature of the underlying obligation, it may be proved 
alinude in determining the dischargeability of a judg-
ment. Greenfield vs. Tuccillo, (1942), (Cir. 2), 129 Fed. 
2d 854. 
In the important recent opinion in Fidelity & 
Casuality Company of New York vs. Golomosky, (1946) 
133 Conn. 317, 50 A. (2d) 817, 819, 820. Nate 60 Harv. L. 
Rev. 638 (1947), the Supreme Court of E1rrors of 
Connecticut unequivocably declared that the judgment-
creditor should be permitted to prove, by evidence dehors 
the record of the action, that the note upon which the 
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judgment was based represented money misappropriated 
by the defendant, and that the debt was not within the 
defendant's discharge in bankruptcy. In so ruling the 
Court in effect, although not expressly, overruled its 
earlier decision in Consolidated Plan of Conn. Inc. vs. 
Bonitatibus 130 Conn. 199, 33 A 2d 140. With respect to 
its ruling in the Bonitatibus case the Court said: 
"We held that the plaintiff could not, in support 
of its reply, go beyond the judgment and the 
record in the first action and offer evidence that 
the loan was obtained by false representations. 
Whether, in view of our present decision, we 
would adhere to that conclusion should such a 
situation again be presented, we have no need to 
consider." 
It is interesting to observe that the reasoning in 
this case flatly rejects the doctrine of waiver where the 
misrepresentation is asserted only to avoid the defense 
of a discharge in bankruptcy. The Court said: 
"The decisions which have held that in determin-
ing the nature of the indebtedness a court cannot 
go behind the judgment record seem generally to 
have overlooked two principles which the cases 
place beyond dispute : Where an action is brought 
upon a note, and a discharge in bankruptcy is set 
up as a defense, proof is admissable to show that 
the underlying debt was created by fraud or one 
of the other excepted causes. American Surety Co. 
vs. McKiearnan, 304 Mich. 322, 8 N.W. 2d 82, 145 
ALR 1235, and note, 1238; Zimmerern vs. Blount, 
238 F. 740,745, 151 C. C. A.-5, 90; and the rendition 
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of a judgment upon an obligation does not change 
the Character of the indebterness. Boynton vs. 
Ball, 121 U.S. 457, 466, 7 S. Ct. 981, 30 L. Ed. 985; 
Brown vs. Hannagan, Supra; Guernsey-Newton 
Co. vs. Napier, 151 Wash. 318. 320, 275 P. 724; 
Argall vs. J adobs, 87 N.Y. 110, 113 41 Am. Rep. 
357; Wade vs. Clark 52 Iowa 158, 159, 2 N.W. 
1039 35 Am. Rep. 262; Young vs. Grau, supra. 
In the light if these accepted principles, there 
would seem to be no escape from the conclusion 
that the redition of a judgment based upon a 
note does not preclude proof by evidence extra-
neous to the record, in reply to a defense of 
discharge in bankruptcy, that the underlying debt 
was created by fraud, embezzlement, misappro-
priation or defalcation within the exception we 
are considering. Moreover, some of the decisions 
above cited falling within the first category seem 
to regard proof that the debt was created by one 
of these causes by means of evidence dehors the 
rendered as involving an attack upon that judg-
ment; that clearly is not so, the plaintiff sues 
upon the judgment, the defendant pleads a 
defense entirely exteraneous to the action in 
which the judgment was rendered, i.e., his dis-
charge and the plaintiff attacks his right to avail 
himself of that defense; the plaintiff is in no 
sense attacking the judgment but is throughout 
insisting upon his right to recover upon it in the 
manner and form in which it was rendered." 
(emphasis supplied) 
In Ghelen vs. Patterson, (1928) 83 N. H. 329, 141 A. 
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914, 915, 916, 917, the plaintiff had brought suit on the 
note and obtained judgment prior to the debtor's dis-
charge in bankruptsy. The bankrupt contended that the 
judgment - debt was released by the discharge even 
though the loan for which the note was given was ob-
tained by fraud. The Supreme Court of New Hampshire 
held that by virtue of the fraud the judgment in con-
tract was not discharged, saying in part: 
"It follows that neither the action on the note 
nor the present action on the judgment debt barred 
an action for the fraud, any more than the proof 
of claim against the defendant's bankrupt estate. 
And the fraud may be pleaded to save the judg-
ment from its release by the discharge in bank-
ruptcy. 
"It follows that liabilities for fraudulently ob-
taining property, as intended by the amendment, 
mean claims arising out of such conduct.. What-
ever maybe the form of action sued on, if it ap-
pears that the cause of action arose from such 
fraud as the section specifies, the liability set 
forth in the action is undischarged. Lund vs. Bull, 
supra; Raymond vs. Cohen, 80 N.Y. 586, 112 A. 
909. Claims created by the fraud of one acting 
in an official or fiduciary capacity. are not dis-
charged whether or not they are 'provable debts' 
at the date of bankruptcy (Brown vs. Hannagan, 
supra), and it must be equally true that the dis-
charge of liabilities for fraudently obtaining prop-
erty otherwise does not depend upon the status 
of such debts. The test is not of ability to show 
that at the date of bankruptcy there was a prov-
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able claim of fraud, but is of ability to show that 
there was then a provable liability of some kind 
which sprang from the bankrupt's fraud. 
Zimmern vs. Blount, (C.C.A.) 238 Fed. 740; 
Gregory vs. Williams, 106 Kan. 819, 189 P. 932. 
"The note became merged in the judgment, but 
the fact that the loan it represented was thus 
obtained applies to the judgment debt as much as 
to the note. That the plaintiff should suffer by 
having reduced the note to judgment before the 
bankruptcy would be to impose a vicarious penalty 
which Congress is not to be assumed to have in-
tended, in the absence of language clearly show-
ing such a purpose." 
The decision in Gehlen vs. Patterson, supra, is also 
noteworthy because of its complete repudiation of the 
theory that the fraud had been waived. The Court 
declared: 
"Nor was there an election of remedies in suing 
on the note rather than for the fraud. The 
plaintiff had two causes of action which were 
separate and independent and she had more than 
a choice between them. Suit on one was not in-
consistent with suit on the other. Suit for the 
fraud would not destroy liability on the note but 
on the contrary would affirm it. Conversely, 
suit on the note did not affect or necessarily 
raise the issue of fraud. While payment of one 
claim might liquidate in full or in part the dam-
ages for the other, yet until such payment both 
claims may be sued on at the same time and, under 
what seems the better procedure, judgments be 
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obtained in both. The judgments would not 
mutually conflict, although satisfaction of one 
would operate to satisfy in full or in part the 
other. 'Where the remedies afforded are incon-
sistent, it is the election of one that bars the 
other; where they are consistent, it is the satis-
faction which operates as a bar.' . Frederickson 
vs. Nye, 110 Oh. St. 459, 144 N.E. 299, 35 A.L.R. 
1163. Parallel situations are found in the fre-
quent instances of separate suits at the same time 
on a note and in foreclosure of its security and 
in separate actions against joint wrongdoers." 
As stated by the Utah Supreme Court in the case 
of National Finance Company of Utah vs. Valdez 11 
Utah 2d 339, 359 P. 2d 9, discussed above, " ... a dis-
charge in bankruptcy is neither a payment nor the ex-
tinguishment of debts. It is simply a bar to their en-
forcement by legal proceedings," and, "a loan evidenced 
by a promissory note which i~ 6-btained by fraud is 
excepted from a discharge in bankruptcy." 
The respondent contends that a loan evidenced by 
a promissory note obtained by fraud being excepted 
from a discharge in bankruptcy, so also is a judgment 
upon such promissory note evidencing a loan obtained 
by fraud. 
As it so often happens, and, has happened in the 
case before this Court, a lender may not be aware of the 
fraud in the inception of the loan contract at the time 
he finds it necessary to institute action on the note. 
The fraud isn't discovered until disclosed through or 
as a result of the bankruptcy proceedings when the 
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bankrupt lists his obligations and the dates when incur-
red as required by the General Orders and Forms for 
bankruptcy. Under such circu1nstances, the Courts are 
particularly hesitant in applying the doctrines of waiver 
and election of remedies, for indeed-how can there 
be a waiver or an election when the existence of the 
second cause of action is unknown. The case of Chester-
Neal Co. vs. Generazzo, (1942) 20 N.J. Misc. 296, 26 A. 
~d 876, was submitted to the Court on stipulated facts 
whereby it was agreed that the defendant, in obtaining 
a loan fro1n the plaintiff, represented, in writing, that 
he had no outstanding indebtedness. The financial state-
ment was false when made, to defendant's knowledge, in 
that he owed debts to a series of other finance and mer-
chandising cmnpanies. When the defendant defaulted, 
plaintiff, still ignorant of the falsity of the representa-
tions, sued defendant on the note and recovered judg-
ment. Thereafter, the defendant filed a petition in bank-
ruptcy and the plaintiff discovered the false representa-
tion. The Court held that the plaintiff was not subject 
to the defense of election of remedies in bringing the 
second suit based on a cause of action in fraud. 
In Personal Finance Company of New Haven vs. 
~lc~lahon (1943) Davlin, Jr., Ct. of Com. Pleas, New 
Haven Co., Conn., the Court, by Memorandum of De-
nlurrer stated: 
"The former action in this case was on the note. 
The essentials for bringing of the fraud action 
did not come into existence until after the de-
fendant had filed his petition in bankruptcy and 
therein disclosed the fraud. Where the fraud is 
not discovered until after entry of judgment on 
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the contract an action for damages for fraud will 
lie. Local Loan Co., Inc. vs. Guinessey, 33 N.Y.S. 
2d 62. The test is not whether the causes of action 
arise out of the same general subject matter, 
but whether one action produces a status which 
necessarily bars the other. Two causes of action 
existed in this case, one on the note and the other 
for fraud. The original action dealt only with 
the former. No claim was made in the latter 
because the existence of facts to support it were 
not known." 
The argument of appellant that in cases holding 
that the court may look outside the record there has 
only been one step in the proceedings, whereas in the 
case now before the Court there has been two (suit on 
note plus suit on judgment based on note), is without 
merit. The test is whether the debt is one incurred 
through "false pretenses or misrepresentations" not how 
far the creditor has gone before it is discovered or how 
far creditor has proceeded before the debtor takes out 
bankruptcy. 
To the appellant's argument that to permit extrinsic 
evidence to be introduced to determine the nature of the 
debt merged in the judgment would cause the bankrupt 
"unreasonable harassment," suffice it to say, that it is 
the intention of the Bankruptcy Act that debts incurred 
through "false pretenses or misrepresentations" should 
not be discharged or bared. If a. person has cheated or 
defrauded another, he should not complain that he is 
subjected to litigation as a result thereof, and if that be 
"unreasonable harassment," then it is intended by the 
bankruptcy act that such persons be so harassed. 
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That the statement contained in 8 C.J.S Bankruptcy 
Sec. 587, cited by appellant accurately states a view 
that has been adopted by some courts, however, such 
view point as set forth in C.J.S. is supported only by 
the citation of two cases and is contrary to the better 
reasoned opinions and the prior decisions of the Utah 
Supreme Court. 
CONCLUSION 
The defendants prior to this action never having 
asserted their discharge in bankruptcy, the plaintiff is 
not bared from showing that the obligation merged into 
plaintiff's judgment was incurred through the fraud or 
misrepresentations of the defendants, and is, thus, ex-
cepted from discharge in bankruptcy. The trial court 
in this action on such judgment may look beyond the 
record of the Ogden City Court action to ascertain 
whether or not the obligation which was merged in the 
Judgment entered by the Ogden City Court is excepted 
from discharge in bankruptcy, and, the defendants Motion 
for Judgment on the Pleadings was, therefore, properly 
denied by the District Court. 
Respectfuly submitted, 
E. MORGAN WIXOM 
1010 First Security Bank Building 
Ogden, Utah 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
and Respondent 
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